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BOUNDS FOR THE DIAMETER OF THE WEIGHT POLYTOPE
SASCHA KURZ
ABSTRACT. A weighted game or a threshold function in general admits different weighted
representations even if the sum of non-negative weights is fixed to one. Here we study
bounds for the diameter of the corresponding weight polytope. It turns out that the di-
ameter can be upper bounded in terms of the maximum weight and the quota or thresh-
old. We apply those results to approximation results between power distributions, given
by power indices, and weights.
1. INTRODUCTION.
Consider a stock corporation whose shares are hold by three major stockholders own-
ing 35%, 34%, and 17%, respectively. The remaining 14% are widely spread. Assum-
ing that decisions are made by a simple majority rule, all three major stockholders have
equal influence on the company’s decisions, while the private shareholders have no say.
To be more precise, any two major stockholders can adopt a proposal, while the pri-
vate shareholders together with an arbitrary major stockholder need further affirmation.
Such decision environments can be captured by means of weighted voting games. For-
mally, a weighted (voting) game consists of a set of players or voters N = {1, . . . , n},
a vector of non-negative weights w = (w1, . . . , wn), and a positive quota q. A proposal
is accepted if and only if the weight sum of its supporters meets or exceeds the quota.
Committees that decide between two alternatives have received wide attention. Von
Neumann and Morgenstern introduced the notion of simple games, which is a super
class of weighted games, in [20]. Examples of decision-making bodies that can be
modeled as weighted games are the US Electoral College, the Council of the European
Union, the UN Security Council, the International Monetary Fund or the Governing
Council of the European Central Bank. Many applications seek to evaluate players’
influence or power in simple or weighted games, see, e.g., [13]. The initial example
illustrates that shares or weights can be a poor proxy for the distribution of power. Using
the taxicab metric, i.e., the ‖ · ‖1-distance, the corresponding distance between shares
and relative power is
∣∣0.35− 1
3
∣∣ + ∣∣0.34− 1
3
∣∣ + ∣∣0.17− 1
3
∣∣ + |0.14− 0| ≈32.67%. If
the weights add up to one, then we speak of relative or normalized weights. The insight
that the power distribution differs from relative weights, triggered the invention of so-
called power indices like the Shapley-Shubik index [18], the Penrose-Banzhaf index [2],
or the nucleolus [17]. Due to the combinatorial nature of most of those power indices,
qualitative assessments are technically demanding and large numbers of involved parties
cause computational challenges [3].
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One reason for the difference between relative weights and power is that a weighted
game permits different representations. If there are two normalized representations
whose weight vectors are at large distance than at least one of the relative weight vec-
tors also has a large distance to the power distribution. So, here we study bounds for the
diameter of the weight polytope, i.e., bounds for the maximum distance between two
normalized vectors of the same weighted game. We will study those bounds in terms of
the number of players, the relative quota, and the maximum relative weight in a given
representation of the game.
Each weighted game, also called threshold function, admits a representation with
integer weights. Bounds for the necessary magnitude of integer weighted are studied in
the literature, see e.g. [1] and the references therein.
The remaining part of the paper is structure as follows. In Section 2 we give the
necessary definitions for simple games, weighted games and the weight polytope. Upper
bounds on the diameter of the weight polytope are given in Section 4 and worst case
lower bounds are given in Section 3. Applications to approximation results for power
indices are given in Section 5 before we draw a brief conclusion in Section 6. Some
lengthy or more technical proofs are moved to an appendix.
2. THE WEIGHT POLYTOPE OF A WEIGHTED GAME.
For a positive integer n let N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of players. A simple game
is a mapping v : 2N → {0, 1} from the subsets of N to binary outcomes satisfying
v(∅) = 0, v(N) = 1, and v(S) ≤ v(T ) for all ∅ ⊆ S ⊆ T ⊆ N . The interpretation
in the context of binary voting systems is as follows. A subset S ⊆ N is considered as
the set of players that are in favor of a proposal, i.e., which vote “yes”. If v(S) = 1 we
call coalition S winning and losing otherwise. ByW(v) we denote the set of winning
coalitions and by L(v) we denote the set of losing coalitions of v. If coalition S is
winning but each proper subset is losing, then we call S minimal winning. Similarly,
if S is losing but each proper superset of S is winning, then we call S maximal losing.
By Wm(v) we denote the set of minimal winning and by Lm(v) we denote the set
of maximal losing coalitions. v(S) encodes the group decision, i.e., v(S) = 1 if the
proposal is accepted and v(S) = 0 otherwise. So, these assumptions for a simple game
are quite natural for a voting system with binary options in the input and output domain.
The dual vd of a simple game v is defined via vd(S) = v(N)− v(N\S) = 1− v(N\S)
and is a simple game itself. If v(S) = v(S ∪ {i}) for all S ⊆ N , then we call player i
a null player. Player i is a passer if v({i}) = 1. Two players i and j are equivalent if
v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S ∪ {j}) for all S ⊆ N\{i, j}.
A simple game v is called weighted if there exist weights w ∈ Rn≥0 and a quota
q ∈ R>0 such that v(S) = 1 if and only if w(S) :=
∑
i∈S wi ≥ q. From the conditions
of a simple game we conclude 0 < q ≤ w(N). If w(N) = 1 we speak of normalized
or relative weights, where 0 < q ≤ 1. We denote the respective game by v = [q;w] and
refer to the pair (q;w) as a weighted representation, i.e., we can have [q;w] = [q′;w′]
but (q;w) 6= (q′;w′). The example from the introduction can, e.g., be represented by
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(51%; 35%, 34%, 17%, 14%),
(
1
2
; 1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
, 0
)
, or (6; 4, 3, 3, 1), where the fourth player
mimics the private shareholders.
Lemma 2.1. If (q;w) is a normalized representation of a weighted game v, then (1 −
q+ ε;w) is a normalized representation of the dual game vd for each 0 < ε < min{q−
w(S) | S ∈ L(v)}.
Proof. Proof. For each losing coalition S of vd the coalition N\S is winning in v, so
that w(N\S) = 1 − w(S) ≥ q and w(S) ≤ 1 − q < 1 − q + ε. Now let S be a
winning coalition, so that N\S is losing in v and ε < q − w(N\S) = q − 1 + w(S),
which is equivalent to w(S) > 1 − q + ε. Since ∅ is a losing coalition in v we have
ε < q − w(∅) = q, so that 1− q + ε < 1.  
Note that min{q − w(S) | S ∈ L(v)} > 0.
Given a weighted game v and a weight vector w we can find a quota q ∈ R>0 such
that v = [q;w] if and only if the largest weight of a losing coalition is strictly smaller
than the smallest weight of a winning coalition. Thus, see e.g. [9, Lemma 3.2], the set
of feasible normalized weight vectors is given by{
w ∈ Rn≥0 | w(N) = 1, v(S) > v(T ) ∀S ∈ W(v), T ∈ L(v)
}
=
{
w ∈ Rn≥0 | w(N) = 1, v(S) > v(T ) ∀S ∈ Wm(v), T ∈ Lm(v)
}
.
Definition 2.2. For a weighted game v we define the weight polytope of v by
W(v) =
{
w ∈ Rn≥0 | w(N) = 1, v(S) ≥ v(T ) ∀S ∈ Wm(v), T ∈ Lm(v)
}
and call
diam(W(v)) = max {‖w − w′‖1 | w,w′ ∈ W(v)}
its diameter.
While not any element in W(v) can be completed by a suitable quota q ∈ (0, 1]
to a normalized representation (q;w), Definition 2.2 makes sense nevertheless since
dim(W(v)) = n−1, see e.g. [9, Lemma 3.4]. More concretely, for each weighted game
v and each ε ∈ R>0 there are w,w′ ∈ W(v) and q, q′ ∈ (0, 1] such that v = [q;w] =
[q′;w′] and
diam(W(v))− ε ≤ ‖w − w′‖1 ≤ diam(W(v)).
Given the indicated linear programming formulation, diam(W(v)) can be computed in
polynomial time (depending on the number of minimal winning and maximal losing
coalitions). The same is true if we replace ‖ · ‖1 by the maximum norm ‖x‖∞ =
max{xi | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} for x ∈ Rn. We denote the corresponding diameter by
diam∞(W(v)). For an arbitrary p-norm ‖ · ‖p with 1 < p < ∞, we can obtain lower
and upper bounds via ‖x‖∞ ≤ ‖x‖p ≤ ‖x‖1, so that we restrict ourselves to these two
distance functions. The bound ‖x‖∞ ≤ ‖x‖1 can be slightly improved in our context.
Lemma 2.3. For w,w′ ∈ Rn≥0 with ‖w‖1 = ‖w′‖1 = 1, we have ‖w − w′‖∞ ≤
1
2
‖w − w′‖1.
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Proof. Proof. With S := {1 ≤ i ≤ n | wi ≤ w′i} and A :=
∑
i∈S (w
′
i − wi), B :=∑
i∈N\S (wi − w′i), where N = {1, . . . , n}, we have A − B = 0 since ‖w‖1 = ‖w′‖1
and w,w′ ∈ Rn≥0. Thus, ‖w − w′‖1 = 2A and ‖w − w′‖∞ ≤ max{A,B} = A.  
What can be said about diam(W(v)) and diam∞(W(v)) in general without solving
the specific linear programs? Obviously, we have diam(W(v)) ≤ 2 and diam∞(W(v)) ≤
1. These bounds are asymptotically attained for n ≥ 2 and v = [n; (1, . . . , 1)], i.e., for
any 0 < ε < 1
n
we can set w = (1− (n− 1) · ε, . . . , ε), w′ = (ε, . . . , ε, 1− (n− 1) · ε),
q = q′ = 1 − ε so that v = [q;w] = [q′;w′], ‖w − w′‖1 = 2 · (1 − nε), and
‖w − w′‖∞ = 1 − 2ε. In other words, (1, 0, . . . , 0), (0, . . . , 0, 1) ∈ W([n; 1, . . . , 1])
attain the desired distances. For the weighted game v with n = 1 players we have
diam(W(v)) = diam∞(W(v)) = 0 sinceW(v) = {(1)}.
In order to obtain tighter bounds for the diameter of the weight polytope we need
more information besides the number of players. Given an exemplary normalized rep-
resentation (q;w), we study key parameters like the relative quota q ∈ (0, 1] or the
maximum relative weight ∆(w) := ‖w‖∞ ∈ (0, 1], where we write ∆ whenever w is
clear from the context. Besides this, also more sophisticated invariants of weight vec-
tors have been studied in applications. The so-called Laakso-Taagepera index a.k.a.
Herfindahl-Hirschman index, c.f. [12], is used in Industrial Organization to measure the
concentration of firms in a market, see, e.g., [4], and given by
L(w) =
(
n∑
i=1
wi
)2
/
n∑
i=1
w2i .
for w ∈ Rn≥0 with w 6= 0. In general we have 1 ≤ L(w) ≤ n. If the weight vector w
is normalized, then the formula simplifies to L(w) = 1/
∑n
i=1 w
2
i . Under the name “ef-
fective number of parties” the index is widely used in political science to measure party
fragmentation, see, e.g., [11]. However, we observe the following relations between the
maximum relative weight ∆ = ∆(w) and the Laakso-Taagepera index L(w):
Lemma 2.4. For w ∈ Rn≥0 with ‖w‖1 = 1, we have
1
∆
≤ 1
∆ (1− α(1− α)∆) ≤ L(w) ≤
1
∆2 + (1−∆)
2
n−1
≤ 1
∆2
for n ≥ 2, where α := 1
∆
− ⌊ 1
∆
⌋ ∈ [0, 1). If n = 1, then ∆ = L(w) = 1.
Proof. Proof. Optimize
n∑
i=1
w2i with respect to the constraints w ∈ Rn, ‖w‖1 = 1, and
∆(w) = ∆, see the appendix for the technical details. 
So, any lower or upper bound involving L(w) can be replaced by a bound involving
∆ instead. Since ∆ has nicer analytical properties and requires less information on w,
we stick to ∆ in the following. We remark that there are similar inequalities for other
indices measuring market concentration. Upper bounds on diam(W(v)), in terms of n,
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q, and ∆, will be given in Section 4 and worst case lower bounds for diam(W(v)) and
diam∞(W(v)) will be given in Section 3.
3. WORST CASE LOWER BOUNDS FOR THE DIAMETER OF THE WEIGHT POLYTOPE.
For integers 1 ≤ k ≤ s and t ≥ 0 we denote by vk,s,t the weighted game with
s players of weight one, t players of weight zero, and a quota of k, i.e., vk,s,t =
[k; 1, . . . , 1, 0, . . . 0]. Players 1, . . . , s are pairwise equivalent as well as players s +
1, . . . s + t, which are null players. If k = 1, then each player 1 ≤ i ≤ s is a passer.
First we study lower bounds for the diameter of those weighted games.
Lemma 3.1. For integers 1 ≤ k < s and t ≥ 0 we have
diam(W(vk,s,t)) ≥ max
{
1
10k
, 1
10(s−k)
}
and diam∞(W(vk,s,t)) ≥ 1s .
Proof. Proof. Let S = {1, . . . s} and T = {s + 1, . . . , s + t}. We start with the lower
bound for diam(W(vk,s,t)). If s ≡ 0 (mod 2) then we set S1 = {1, . . . , s/2}, S0 = ∅,
and S−1 = {s/2 + 1, . . . , s}. If s ≡ 1 (mod 2), then we set S1 = {1, . . . , (s − 1)/2},
S0 = {(s+1)/2}, and S−1 = {(s+3)/2, . . . , s}. Let 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1s be a parameter that we
specify latter depending on further case differentiations. With this, we set wi = 1s + γ
for all i ∈ S1, wi = 1s for all i ∈ S0, wi = 1s − γ for all i ∈ S−1, wi = w¯i = 0 for all
i ∈ T , and w¯i = ws+1−i for all i ∈ S. It is easily verified that w ∈ Rs+t≥0 and ‖w‖1 = 1.
In order to conclude w ∈ W(vk,s,t) it suffices to check w(U) + w(T ) = w(U) ≤ w(V )
for all U, V ⊆ S with |U | = k − 1 and |V | = k. Since w¯ is a permutation of w,
w ∈ W(vk,s,t) implies w¯ ∈ W(vk,s,t), so that
diam(W(vk,s,t)) ≥ ‖w − w¯‖1 = 2γ · |S1| = 2γ ·
⌊s
2
⌋ s≥2≥ γs
2
.
If k ≤ s+1
2
we set γ = 1
s(2k−1) ≤ 1s . For U, V ⊆ S with |U | = k − 1 and |V | = k
we have w(U) ≤ (k − 1) · (1
s
+ γ
)
and w(V ) ≥ k · (1
s
− γ) so that w(U) ≤ w(V ) and
diam(W(vk,s,t)) ≥ 14k ≥ 110(s−k) .
If k ≥ s+2
2
we set γ = 1
s(2s+3−2k) ≤ 1s . For U, V ⊆ S with |U | = k − 1 and |V | = k
we have
w(U) ≤ s
2
·
(
1
s
+ γ
)
+
1
s
+
(
k − 1− s
2
− 1
)
·
(
1
s
− γ
)
and
w(V ) ≥ s
2
·
(
1
s
− γ
)
+
1
s
+
(
k − s
2
− 1
)
·
(
1
s
+ γ
)
so that w(U) ≤ w(V ) and
diam(W(vk,s,t)) ≥ γs
2
≥ 1
2(2(s− k) + 3)
s−k≥1≥ 1
10(s− k) ≥
1
10k
.
Next we consider the lower bound for diam∞(W(vk,s,t)). We set γ = 12s , w1 = w¯2 =
1
s
+ γ, w2 = w¯1 = 1s − γ, wi = w¯i = 1s for all 3 ≤ i ≤ s, and wi = w¯i = 0 for all i ∈ T .
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It is easily verified that w ∈ Rs+t≥0 and ‖w‖1 = 1. In order to conclude w ∈ W(vk,s,t) it
suffices to check w(U) + w(T ) = w(U) ≤ w(V ) for all U, V ⊆ S with |U | = k − 1
and |V | = k. The latter follows from w(U) ≤ k−1
s
+ γ and w(V ) ≥ k
s
− γ. Since w¯ is
a permutation of w, we also have w¯ ∈ W(vk,s,t), so that
diam∞(W(vk,s,t)) ≥ ‖w − w¯‖∞ = 2γ = 1
s
.
 
For the excluded cases k = s we have:
Lemma 3.2. For integers s ≥ 1 and t ≥ 0 with t+ s ≥ 2 we have
diam(W(vs,s,t)) ≥ 2
3
and diam∞(W(vs,s,t)) ≥ 1
3
.
Proof. Proof. Let 0 < ε < 1
s
be arbitrary. If s ≥ 2 we choose w1 = w¯s = 1− (s− 1)ε,
wi = w¯s+1−i = ε for all 2 ≤ i ≤ s, and wi = w¯i = 0 for all s+ 1 ≤ i ≤ s+ t. We can
easily check w, w¯ ∈ W(vs,s,t). Since ‖w− w¯‖1 = 2 · (1− sε) and ‖w− w¯‖∞ = 1− sε
we have diam(W(vs,s,t)) ≥ 23 and diam∞(W(vs,s,t)) ≥ 13 using ε < 23s .
If s = 1 then we consider w = (1, 0, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ W(v1,1,t) and w¯ = (23 , 13 , 0, . . . , 0) ∈
W(v1,1,t). Thus, diam(W(v1,1,t)) ≥ ‖w − w¯‖1 = 23 and diam∞(W(v1,1,t)) ≥ ‖w −
w¯‖∞ = 13 .  
Next we show that for a given relative quota q ∈ (0, 1] or a given maximum relative
weight ∆ ∈ (0, 1] we can construct a weighted game v, for any suitably large number
of players, with matching representation such that diam(W(v)) is lower bounded by
a positive constant independent of q or ∆. Actually, we construct two representations
of the same weighted game and give a lower bound for the distance between the two
normalized weight vectors.
Lemma 3.3. For each q ∈ (0, 1] there exists a weighted game v = [q;w] = [q; w¯] with
n ≥ 2 players, where w, w¯ ∈ Rn≥0, and ‖w‖1 = ‖w¯‖1 = 1, such that ‖w − w¯‖∞ ≥ 13
and ‖w − w¯‖1 ≥ 23 .
Proof. Proof. We give general constructions for different ranges of q:
• 2
3
< q ≤ 1: w = (2
3
, 1
3
, 0, . . . , 0
)
, w¯ =
(
1
3
, 2
3
, 0, . . . , 0
)
;
• 1
3
< q ≤ 2
3
: w =
(
2
3
, 1
3
, 0, . . . , 0
)
, w¯ = (1, 0, . . . , 0);
• 0 < q ≤ 1
3
: w =
(
2
3
, 1
3
, 0, . . . , 0
)
, w¯ =
(
1
3
, 2
3
, 0, . . . , 0
)
.
 
Lemma 3.4. Let ∆ ∈ (0, 1] and n ≥ 1
∆
+ 1. There exist w, w¯ ∈ Rn≥0, q, q¯ ∈ (0, 1] with
‖w‖1 = ‖w¯‖1 = 1, ∆(w) = ∆, [q;w] = [q¯, w¯], and 12 · ‖w − w¯‖1 ≥ ‖w − w¯‖∞ ≥ 17 .
Proof. Proof. We set s =
⌊
1
∆
⌋ ≥ 1 and t = n − s ≥ 1, since n ≥ 1
∆
+ 1 ≥ s + 1. For
w = (∆, . . . ,∆, 1 − s · ∆, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ Rn≥0, with s entries being equal to ∆, we have
∆(w) = ∆ and [q;w] ∈ W(vs,s,t), where 0 < q = s∆ ≤ 1. Due to Lemma 3.2 we have
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diam∞(W(vs,s,t)) ≥ 13 , so that the triangle inequality implies the existence of a vector
w′ ∈ W(vs,s,t) with ‖w − w′‖∞ ≥ 16 . If w′ is on the boundary of W(vs,s,t) we slightly
perturb w′ to w¯ in the interior ofW(vs,s,t) and complete it to a representation (q¯, w¯) with
q¯ ∈ (0, 1], [q;w] = [q¯, w¯], and ‖w− w¯‖∞ ≥ 17 . The inequality 12 ·‖w− w¯‖1 ≥ |w− w¯‖∞
follows from Lemma 2.3.  
By a tailored construction we can obtain a slightly more general result:
Lemma 3.5. For each ∆ ∈ (0, 1) there exists a weighted game v = [q;w] = [q; w¯]
with n ≥ 4
3∆
+ 6 players, where q ∈ (0, 1), w, w¯ ∈ Rn≥0, ∆(w) = ∆(w¯) = ∆, and
‖w‖1 = ‖w¯‖1 = 1, such that ‖w − w¯‖1 ≥ 23 and ‖w − w¯‖∞ ≥ ∆/2.
Proof. Proof. If ∆ ≥ 2
3
, we can consider a weighted game with two passers and n − 2
null players. One representation is given by q = 1 −∆ and w = (∆, 1 −∆, 0, . . . , 0).
Of course we can swap the weights of the first two players and obtain a second repre-
sentation given by quota q an weight vector w¯ = (1 − ∆,∆, 0, . . . , 0). With this, we
compute ‖w − w¯‖1 = 2 · (2∆− 1) ≥ 23 and ‖w − w¯‖∞ = 2∆− 1 ≥ ∆/2.
If 0 < ∆ < 2
3
, we define an integer a :=
⌊
2
3∆
⌋ ≥ 1 and consider a weighted game
with 2a passers and n − 2a null players. One representation is given by q = ∆/2,
w2i−1 = ∆, w2i = ∆/2 for 1 ≤ i ≤ a, w2a+1 = w2a+3 = w2a+5 = 13 − a∆2 ≥ 0,
w2a+2 = w2a+4 = w2a+6 = 0, and wi = 0 for all 2a + 7 ≤ i ≤ n. By assumption
we have n ≥ 2a + 6 and the first 2a players are obviously passers. By checking 0 ≤
1
3
− a∆
2
< ∆
2
we conclude that the remaining players are null players and have a non-
negative weight. By construction, the weights of the n players sum up to one. Changing
the weights of player 2i − 1 and player 2i for 1 ≤ i ≤ a does not change the game so
that we obtain a second representation with quota q and weights w¯2i = ∆, w¯2i−1 = ∆/2
for 1 ≤ i ≤ a, w¯2a+2 = w¯2a+4 = w¯2a+6 = 13 − a∆2 ≥ 0, w2a+1 = w2a+3 = w2a+4 =
w¯2a+1 = w¯2a+2 = w¯2a+3 = 0, and w¯i = 0 for all 2a + 7 ≤ i ≤ n. With this, we have
‖w − w¯‖1 = a∆ + 2− 3a∆ = 2(1− a∆) ≥ 23 and ‖w − w¯‖∞ = ∆/2.  
For each w, w¯ ∈ Rn with ∆(w) = ∆(w¯), we obviously have ‖w − w¯‖∞ ≤ ∆(w).
So, a constant lower bound for the | · ‖∞-norm can only exist if we slightly weaken the
assumptions as done in Lemma 3.4.
In some applications only weighted games with a quota of at least one half are consid-
ered which clashes with some of our constructions in the proofs of the previous lemmas.
However, by considering the dual of a given weighted game we can turn a quota below
one half to a quota above one half, see Lemma 2.1. So, instead of small quotas we get
large quotas.
So, either knowing the relative quota or the maximum relative weight is not sufficient
in order to deduce a non-constant upper bound on the diameter of the weight polytope
for a suitably large number of players. However, as we will see in the next section,
knowing the relative quota and the maximum relative weight is indeed sufficient for
such an upper bound, see Theorem 4.4. Our next aim is to show that this upper bound
is tight up to a constant.
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Lemma 3.6. For each 0 < q < 1, 0 < ∆ ≤ 1, and each integer n ≥ 1
∆
+ 2 there exist
weight vectors w, w¯ ∈ Rn≥0 with ‖w‖1 = ‖w¯‖1 = 1, ∆(w) = ∆ and a quota 0 < q¯ ≤ 1
with [q;w] = [q¯; w¯] such that
‖w − w¯‖1 ≥ 1
200
·min
{
2,
4∆
min{q, 1− q}
}
.
Under the same assumptions there exist weight vectors w, w¯ ∈ Rn≥0 with ‖w‖1 =
‖w¯‖1 = 1, ∆(w) = ∆ and a quota 0 < q¯ ≤ 1 with [q;w] = [q¯; w¯] such that
‖w − w¯‖∞ ≥ ∆5 .
Proof. Proof. We set a =
⌊
1
∆
⌋ ≥ 1 and choose the unique integer b with b∆ < q and
(b + 1)∆ ≥ q. With this we set k = b + 1 ≥ 1 and w = (∆, . . . ,∆, 1− a∆, 0, . . . , 0),
where 0 ≤ 1− a∆ < ∆, so that w ∈ Rn≥0 and ‖w‖1 = 1. If b∆ + (1− a∆) < q we set
s = a and s = a+ 1 otherwise, so that [q;w] = vk,s,n−s. Note that n− s ≥ 1.
If k = s, then Lemma 3.2 gives diam(W(vs,s,t)) ≥ 23 , so that the triangle inequality
implies the existence of a vector w′ ∈ W(vs,s,t) with ‖w − w′‖1 ≥ 13 . If k < s, then
Lemma 3.1 gives diam(W(vk,s,t)) ≥ max
{
1
10k
, 1
10(s−k)
}
, so that the triangle inequality
implies the existence of a vector w′ ∈ W(vk,s,t) with
‖w − w′‖1 ≥ max
{
1
20k
,
1
20(s− k)
}
=
1
20s
· 1
min
{
k
s
, s−k
s
} .
If k = 1 or s − k = 1, then ‖w − w′‖1 ≥ 120 . In the following we assume k ≥ 2 and
s− k ≥ 2. By construction we have k
2
≤ (k− 1)∆ < q, k∆ ≥ q, and (s− 1)∆ ≤ 1, so
that k < 2q
∆
, s−k
2
∆ ≤ (s− 1)∆− k∆ ≤ 1− q and s− k ≤ 2(1−q)
∆
.
If k ≤ s− k then q ≤ 1
2
and
‖w − w′‖1 ≥ 1
20s
· 1
min
{
k
s
, s−k
s
} = 1
20k
≥ 1
40
· ∆
q
=
1
40
· ∆
min{q, 1− q} .
If k > s− k then q > 1
2
and
‖w − w′‖1 ≥ 1
20s
· 1
min
{
k
s
, s−k
s
} = 1
20(s− k) ≥
1
40
· ∆
1− q =
1
40
· ∆
min{q, 1− q} .
Thus,
‖w − w′‖1 ≥ 1
160
·min
{
2,
4∆
min{q, 1− q}
}
in all cases. If w′ is on the boundary ofW(vk,s,n−s), then we slightly perturb w′ to w¯ in
the interior ofW(vk,s,n−s) and choose a quota q¯ ∈ (0, 1] such that [q¯; w¯] = vk,s,n−s. This
gives the statement for the ‖ · ‖1-distance.
For the ‖ · ‖∞-distance we choose w with [q;w] = vk,s,n−s as above. If k = s,
then Lemma 3.2 gives diam∞(W(vs,s,t)) ≥ 13 , so that the triangle inequality implies the
existence of a vector w′ ∈ W(vs,s,t) with ‖w − w′‖∞ ≥ 16 . If k < s, then Lemma 3.1
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gives diam∞(W(vk,s,t)) ≥ 1s , so that the triangle inequality implies the existence of a
vector w′ ∈ W(vk,s,t) with ‖w − w′‖∞ ≥ 12s . For s = 1 this gives ‖w − w′‖∞ ≥ 12 . For
s ≥ 2 we have s ≤ 2
∆
so that ‖w − w′‖∞ ≥ ∆4 . Since ∆ ≤ 1 we have ‖w − w′‖∞ ≥ ∆4
in all cases, so that the stated result follows possibly by a perturbation.  
4. UPPER BOUNDS FOR THE DIAMETER OF THE WEIGHT POLYTOPE.
Before we start to upper bound diam(W(v)) in terms of ∆ and q, we provide a slightly
more general result.
Lemma 4.1. Let w ∈ Rn≥0 with ‖w‖1 = 1 for an integer n ∈ N>0 and 0 < q < 1. For
each x ∈ Rn≥0 with ‖x‖1 = 1 and x(S) =
∑
s∈S xs ≥ q for every winning coalition S
of [q;w], we have
‖w − x‖1 ≤ 2∆
min{q + ∆, 1− q} ≤
2∆
min{q, 1− q} ,
where ∆ = ∆(w).
Proof. Proof. Consider a winning coalition T such that x(T ) is minimal and invoke
x(T ) ≥ q, see the appendix for the technical details.  
From Lemma 4.1 we can directly conclude:
Corollary 4.2. Let w, w¯ ∈ Rn≥0 with ‖w‖1 = ‖w¯‖1 = 1 for an integer n ∈ N>0 and
0 < q, q¯ < 1. If [q;w] = [q¯; w¯], then we have
‖w−w¯‖1 ≤ max
{
2∆(w)
min{q, 1− q} ,
2∆(w¯)
min{q¯, 1− q¯}
}
≤ 2∆(w)
min{q, 1− q}+
2∆(w¯)
min{q¯, 1− q¯} .
Unfortunately, this does not allow us to derive a bound on ‖w − w¯‖1 which only
depends on q and ∆(w). However, we can obtain the following analog of Lemma 4.1
for losing instead of winning coalitions.
Lemma 4.3. Let w ∈ Rn≥0 with ‖w‖1 = 1, ∆ = ∆(w), and 0 < q < 1. For each
x ∈ Rn≥0 with ‖x‖1 = 1 and x(S) =
∑
s∈S xs ≤ q for every losing coalition S of [q;w],
we have
‖w − x‖1 ≤ 4∆
min{q, 1− q} .
Moreover, if q > ∆, then ‖w − x‖1 ≤ 2∆min{q−∆,1−q+∆} ≤ 2∆min{q−∆,1−q} .
Proof. Proof. Consider a losing coalition T such that x(T ) is maximal and invoke
x(T ) ≤ q. Technical details are provided in the appendix.  
Theorem 4.4. Let w, w¯ ∈ Rn≥0 with ‖w‖1 = ‖w¯‖1 = 1, ∆ = ∆(w), and 0 < q, q¯ < 1.
If [q;w] = [q¯; w¯], then we have
‖w − w¯‖1 ≤ min
{
2,
4∆
min{q, 1− q}
}
≤ 4∆
min{q, 1− q} ,
10 SASCHA KURZ
i.e., diam(W([q;w])) ≤ 4∆(w)
min{q,1−q} . Moreover, if q > ∆, then we have
‖w − w¯‖1 ≤ 2∆
min{q −∆, 1− q} .
Proof. Proof. In Section 2 we have observed ‖w− w¯‖1 ≤ 2. If q¯ ≥ q, then w¯(S) ≥ q¯ ≥
q for every winning coalition S of [q;w]. Here, we can apply Lemma 4.1. Otherwise we
have w¯(T ) < q¯ < q for every losing coalition T of [q;w] and Lemma 4.3 applies. 
5. APPLICATIONS.
A power index ϕ is a mapping from the set of weighted games on n players into
R≥0. We call ϕ efficient if ‖ϕ(v)‖1 = 1 for all weighted games v. The difference
‖w − ϕ([q;w])‖1 between relative weights and the corresponding power distribution
is studied in the literature, see e.g. [5, 10, 15]. Lemma 4.1 is a generalization of [10,
Lemma 1]: if ϕ is the nucleolus, see e.g. [17], and 0 < q < 1 then
‖w − ϕ([q;w])‖1 ≤ 2∆(w)
min{q, 1− q}
for all w ∈ Rn≥0 with ‖w‖1 = 1. From Theorem 4.4 we directly conclude:
Corollary 5.1. Let w ∈ Rn≥0 with ‖w‖1 = 1 and 0 < q < 1. If an efficient power index
ϕ permits the existence of a quota q′ ∈ (0, 1) such that [q′;ϕ([q;w])] = [q;w], i.e., the
power vector of the given weighted game can be completed to a representation of the
same game, then
‖w − ϕ([q;w])‖1 ≤ 4∆(w)
min{q, 1− q} .
Representation compatibility of ϕ for [q;w] is automatically satisfied for the mod-
ified nucleolus (modiclus) [19], minimum sum representation index [6] or one of the
power indices based on averaged representations [8] for all weighted games and for the
Penrose-Banzhaf index for all spherically separable simple games [7]. The theorem also
applies to the bargaining model for weighted games analyzed in [16], cf. [14].
For the other direction we have:
Lemma 5.2. Let n ∈ N>0, q, q¯ ∈ (0, 1], w, w¯ ∈ Rn≥0 with ‖w‖1 = ‖w¯‖1 = 1 and
[q;w] = [q¯; w¯], ‖ · ‖ be an arbitrary norm on Rn and ϕ be a mapping from the set of
weighted games (on n players) into Rn≥0, then we have
max {‖w − ϕ ([q;w])‖ , ‖w¯ − ϕ ([q¯; w¯])‖} ≥ ‖w − w¯‖
2
.
Proof. Proof. Using the triangle inequality yields ‖w − ϕ ([q;w])‖+‖w¯ − ϕ ([q¯; w¯])‖ ≥
‖w − w¯‖ from which we can conclude the stated inequality.  
Proposition 5.3. Let ϕ be a mapping from the set of weighted games (on n players) into
Rn≥0.
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(i) For each q ∈ (0, 1] and each integer n ≥ 2 there exists a weighted game [q;w],
where w ∈ Rn≥0 and ‖w‖1 = 1, such that ‖w − ϕ([q;w])‖1 ≥ 13 and ‖w −
ϕ([q;w])‖∞ ≥ 16 .
(ii) For each ∆ ∈ (0, 1) and each integer n ≥ 4
3∆
+ 6 there exists a weighted
game [q;w], where q ∈ (0, 1], w ∈ Rn≥0, ‖w‖1 = 1, and ∆(w) = ∆, such that
‖w − ϕ([q;w])‖1 ≥ 13 , and ‖w − ϕ([q;w])‖∞ ≥ ∆/4.
Proof. Proof. Combine Lemma 5.2 with lemmas 3.3 and 3.5.  
Proposition 5.4. Let ϕ be a mapping from the set of weighted games (on n players)
into Rn≥0. For each q ∈ (0, 1), ∆ ∈ (0, 1], there exist w, w¯ ∈ Rn≥0, q¯ ∈ (0, 1] with
‖w‖1 = ‖w¯‖1 = 1, ∆(w) = ∆, [q;w] = [q¯; w¯], and
‖w¯ − ϕ([q¯; w¯])‖1 ≥ 1
200
·min
{
2,
4∆
min{q, 1− q}
}
.
Proof. Proof. We construct w as in the proof of Lemma 3.6 and choose integers k, s,
and t such that [q;w] = vk,s,t. In the proof of Lemma 3.6 we have actually verified
diam(W([q;w])) ≥ 1
80
·min
{
2,
4∆
min{q, 1− q}
}
=: Λ.
Now choose w′, w′′ ∈ W([q;w]) with ‖w′ − w′′‖1 ≥ Λ. By the triangle inequality we
have either ‖w′−ϕ([q;w])‖1 ≥ Λ/2 or ‖w′′−ϕ([q;w])‖1 ≥ Λ/2. By choosing w¯ as w′
or w′′ and eventually moving it into the interior ofW([q;w]) we obtain the stated result.
 
6. CONCLUSION.
In Theorem 4.4 we have shown that
diam(W([q;w])) ≤ min
{
2,
4∆
min{q, 1− q}
}
≤ 4∆
min{q, 1− q} ,
for any q ∈ (0, 1) and any w ∈ Rn≥0 with ‖w‖1 = 1. Lemma 3.6 certifies that this upper
bound is in general, i.e., in the worst case, tight up to a constant. (This paper traded
smaller constants for easier proofs.) The super-exponential growth of the number of
weighted games, see [21] indicates that this is not the case for the majority of weighted
games. Thus, it would be interesting to determine other parameters of a representation
of a weighted game that permit tight upper bounds on the diameter of the corresponding
weight polytope. As shown in Section 5, there are connections to approximations of
power indices by weight vectors. Proposition 5.4 gives a partial explanation for the
conditions of the main theorem of [15] on a limit result for the Shapley-Shubik index.
APPENDIX A. DELAYED PROOFS
Proof. Proof of Lemma 2.4. For n = 1, we have w1 = 1, ∆(w) = 1, α = 0, and
L(w) = 1, so that we assume n ≥ 2 in the remaining part of the proof. For wi ≥ wj
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consider a := wi+wj
2
and x := wi− a, so that wi = a+ x and wj = a− x. With this we
have w2i +w
2
j = 2a
2 + 2x2 and (wi + y)2 + (wj− y)2 = 2a2 + 2(x+ y)2. Let us assume
that w? minimizes
∑n
i=1w
2
i under the conditions w ∈ R≥0, ‖w‖1 = 1, and ∆(w) = ∆.
(Since the target function is continuous and the feasible set is compact and non-empty,
a global minimum indeed exists.) W.l.o.g. we assume w?1 = ∆. If there are indices
2 ≤ i, j ≤ n with w?i > w?j , i.e., x > 0 in the above parameterization, then we may
choose y = −x. Setting w′i := w?i + y = a =
w?i +w
?
j
2
, w′j := w
?
j − y = a =
w?i +w
?
j
2
, and
w′h := w
?
h for all 1 ≤ h ≤ nwith h /∈ {i, j}, we havew′ ∈ Rn≥0, ‖w′‖1 = 1, ∆(w′) = ∆,
and
∑n
h=1 (w
′
h)
2 =
∑n
h=1 (w
?
h)
2 − x2. Since this contradicts the minimality of w?, we
have w?i = w
?
j for all 2 ≤ i, j ≤ n, so that we conclude w?i = 1−∆n−1 for all 2 ≤ i ≤ n
from 1 = ‖w?‖1 =
n∑
h=1
w?h. Thus, L(w) ≤ 1/
(
∆2 + (1−∆)
2
n−1
)
, which is tight. Since
∆ ≤ 1 and n ≥ 2, we have 1/
(
∆2 + (1−∆)
2
n−1
)
≤ 1
∆2
, which is tight if and only if
∆ = 1, i.e., n− 1 of the weights have to be equal to zero.
Now, let us assume that w maximizes
∑n
i=1w
2
i under the conditions w ∈ R≥0,
‖w‖1 = 1, and ∆(w) = ∆. (Due to the same reason a global maximum indeed ex-
ists.) Due to 1 = ‖w‖1 ≤ n∆ we have 0 < ∆ ≤ 1/n, where ∆ = 1/n implies wi = ∆
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. In that case we have L(w) = n and α = 0, so that the stated lower
bounds for L(w) are valid. In the remaining cases we assume ∆ > 1/n. If there would
exist two indices 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n with wi ≥ wj , wi < ∆, and wj > 0, we may strictly in-
crease the target function by moving weight from wj to wi (this corresponds to choosing
y > 0), by an amount small enough to still satisfy the constraints wi ≤ ∆ and wj ≥ 0.
Since ∆ > 0, we can set a := b1/∆c ≥ 0 with a ≤ n − 1 due to ∆ > 1/n. Thus, for
a maximum solution, we have exactly a weights that are equal to ∆, one weight that is
equal to 1 − a∆ ≥ 0 (which may indeed be equal to zero), and n − a − 1 weights that
are equal to zero. With this and a∆ = 1 − α∆ we have ∑ni=1w2i = a∆2(1 − a∆)2 =
∆ − α∆2 + α2∆2 = ∆(1 − α∆ + α2∆) = ∆ (1− α(1− α)∆) ≤ ∆. Here, the latter
inequality is tight if and only if α = 0, i.e., 1/∆ ∈ N.  
Proof. Proof of Lemma 4.1. We set N = {1, . . . , n}, w(U) = ∑u∈U wu and x(U) =∑
u∈U xu for each U ⊆ N . Let S+ = {i ∈ N | xi > wi} and S− = {i ∈ N | xi ≤ wi},
i.e., S+ and S− partition the set N of players. We have w(S+) < 1 since w(S+) <
x(S+) ≤ x(N) = 1, so that w(S−) > 0. Define 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 by x(S−) = (1− δ)w(S−).
We have
x(S+) = 1− x(S−) = w(S+) + w(S−)− (1− δ)w(S−) = w(S+) + δw(S−) (1)
and
‖w − x‖1 =
(
x(S+)− w(S+))+ (w(S−)− x(S−)) = 2δw(S−). (2)
Generate a set T by starting at T = ∅ and successively add a remaining player i in
N\T with minimal xi/wi, where all players j with wj = 0 are the worst ones. Stop if
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w(T ) ≥ q. By construction T is a winning coalition of [q;w] with w(T ) < q+ ∆, since
the generating process did not stop earlier and wj ≤ ∆(w) for all j ∈ N .
If w(S−) ≥ q, we have T ⊆ S− and x(T )/w(T ) ≤ x(S−)/w(S−) = 1 − δ. Multi-
plying by w(T ) and using w(T ) < q + ∆ yields
x(T ) ≤ (1− δ)w(T ) < (1− δ)(q + ∆) = (1− δ)q + (1− δ)∆. (3)
Since x(T ) ≥ q, as T is a winning coalition, we conclude δ < ∆/(q + ∆). Using this
and w(S−) < 1 in Equation (2) yields
‖w − x‖1 < 2∆
q + ∆
<
2∆
q
. (4)
If w(S−) < q, we have S− ⊆ T , x(T ) = x(S−) + x(T\S−), w(T\S−) > 0, and
w(S+) > 0. Since T\S− ⊆ S+, x(T\S−)/w(T\S−) ≤ x(S+)/w(S+), so that
x(T ) = x(S−) + x(T\S−) ≤ (1− δ)w(S−) + x(S
+)
w(S+)
· (w(T )− w(S−))
≤ (1− δ)w(S−) + x(S
+)
w(S+)
· (q + ∆− w(S−))
= q +
x(S+)∆− (1− q)δw(S−)
w(S+)
≤ q + ∆− (1− q)δw(S
−)
w(S+)
.
Since x(T ) ≥ q, we conclude (1− q)δw(S−) ≤ ∆, so that ‖w − x‖1 ≤ 2∆1−q .  
Proof. Proof of Lemma 4.3. If q ≤ 2∆, then 4∆
min{q,1−q} ≥ 4∆q ≥ 2 ≥ ‖x− w‖1, so that
we can assume q > ∆.
Using the notation from the proof of Lemma 4.1, we have x(S+) = w(S+)+δw(S−)
and ‖w − x‖1 = 2δw(S−).
Generate T by starting at T = ∅ and successively add a remaining player i in N\T
with maximal xi/wi, where all players j with wj = 0 are taken in the first rounds,
as long as w(T ) + wi < q. By construction T is a losing coalition of [q;w] with
q −∆ ≤ w(T ) < q, since the generating process did not stop earlier.
If w(S+) ≥ q, we have T ⊆ S+ and x(T )/w(T ) ≥ x(S+)/w(S+) = 1 + δw(S−)
w(S+)
≥
1 + δw(S−). Multiplying by w(T ) and using w(T ) ≥ q −∆ yields
x(T ) ≥ (1 + δw(S−))w(T ) ≥ (1 + δw(S−)) (q −∆) = (q −∆) + δw(S−)(q −∆).
Since x(T ) ≤ q, as T is a losing coalition, we conclude δw(S−) ≤ ∆/(q −∆), so that
‖w − x‖1 < 2∆q−∆ .
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If w(S+) < q, we have S+ ⊆ T , x(T ) = x(S+) + x(T\S+), w(T\S+) > 0, and
w(S−) > 0. Since T\S+ ⊆ S−, x(T\S+)/w(T\S+) ≥ x(S−)/w(S−), so that
x(T ) = x(S+) + x(T\S+) ≥ w(S+) + δw(S−) + x(S
−)
w(S−)
· (w(T )− w(S+))
≥ w(S+) + δw(S−) + (1− δ) · (q −∆− w(S+))
= δw(S−) + q −∆− δq + δ∆ + δw(S+) = q −∆ + δ(1− q + ∆).
Since x(T ) ≤ q, δ ≤ ∆
1−q+∆ , so that ‖w − x‖1 ≤ 2∆1−q+∆ due to w(S−) ≤ 1.
So, for q > ∆ we have ‖w−x‖1 ≤ 2∆min{q−∆,1−q+∆} ≤ 2∆min{q−∆,1−q} . In order to show
‖w − x‖1 ≤ 4∆min{q,1−q} it remains to consider the case q ≤ 1 − q. For q > 2∆, see the
start of the proof, we have ‖w − x‖1 ≤ 2∆min{q−∆,1−q} ≤ 2∆q−∆ ≤ 4∆q ≤ 4∆min{q,1−q} . 
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